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Abstract
There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The
focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through
the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blam-
able for a statement if the statement is true, but the coali-
tion had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is
a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes
properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.
Introduction
It was a little after 9am on Friday, July 20th 2018, when a
four-year-old boy accidentally shot his two-year old cousin
in the town of Muscoy in Southern California. The vic-
tim was taken to a hospital, where she died an hour
later (Oreskes 2018). The police arrested Cesar Lopez, vic-
tim’s grandfather, as a felon in possession of a firearm and
for child endangerment (Juarez and Miracle 2018).
The first charge against Lopez, a previously convicted
felon, is based on California Penal Code §29800 (a) (1) that
prohibits firearm access to “any person who has been con-
victed of, or has an outstanding warrant for, a felony un-
der the laws of the United States, the State of California, or
any other state, government, or country...”. We assume that
Lopez knew that California state law bans him from owning
a gun, but his actions guaranteed that he broke the law.
The second charge is different because Lopez clearly
never intended for his granddaughter to be killed. He never
took any actions that would force her death. Nevertheless,
he is blamed for not taking an action (locking the gun) to
prevent the tragedy. Blameworthiness is tightly connected to
the legal liability for negligence (Goudkamp 2004).
We are interested in logical systems for reasoning about
different forms of responsibility. Xu (1998) introduced a
complete axiomatization of a modal logical system for rea-
soning about responsibility defined as taking actions that
guarantee a certain outcome. In our example, by possessing
a gun Lopez guaranteed that he was responsible for brak-
ing California law. Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard (2009)
extended Xu’s work from individual responsibility to group
responsibility. In this paper we propose a complete logical
system for reasoning about another form of responsibility
that we call blameworthiness: a coalition is blamable for an
outcome ϕ if ϕ is true, but the coalition had a strategy to
prevent ϕ. In our example, Lopez had a strategy to prevent
the death by keeping the gun in a safe place.
Principle of Alternative Possibilities Throughout
centuries, blameworthiness, especially in the context of
free will and moral responsibility, has been at the focus
of philosophical discussions (Singer and Eddon 2013).
Modern works on this topic include (Fields 1994;
Fischer and Ravizza 2000; Nichols and Knobe 2007;
Mason 2015; Widerker 2017). Frankfurt (1969) acknowl-
edges that a dominant role in these discussions has been
played by what he calls a principle of alternate possi-
bilities: “a person is morally responsible for what he has
done only if he could have done otherwise”. As with
many general principles, this one has many limitations
that Frankfurt discusses; for example, when a person is
coerced into doing something. Following the established
tradition (Widerker 2017), we refer to this principle as
the principle of alternative possibilities. Cushman (2015)
talks about counterfactual possibility: “a person could have
prevented their harmful conduct, even though they did not.”
Halpern and Pearl proposed several versions of a formal
definition of causality as a relation between sets of vari-
ables (Halpern 2016). This definition uses the counterfac-
tual requirement which formalizes the principle of alterna-
tive possibilities. Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner (2018) used
a similar setting to define degrees of blameworthiness. Ba-
tusov and Soutchanski (2018) gave a counterfactual-based
definition of causality in situation calculus.
Coalitional Power in Strategic Games Pauly (2001;
2002) introduced logics of coalitional power that can
be used to describe group abilities to achieve a certain
result. His approach has been widely studied in the liter-
ature (Goranko 2001; van der Hoek and Wooldridge 2005;
Borgo 2007; Sauro et al. 2006; A˚gotnes et al. 2010;
A˚gotnes, van der Hoek, and Wooldridge 2009;
Belardinelli 2014; Goranko, Jamroga, and Turrini 2013;
Alechina et al. 2011; Galimullin and Alechina 2017;
Goranko and Enqvist 2018).
In this paper we use Marc Pauly’s framework to define
blameworthiness of coalitions of players in strategic (one-
shot) games. We say that a coalition C could be blamed for
an outcome ϕ if ϕ is true, but the coalition C had a strat-
egy to prevent ϕ. Thus, just like Halpern and Pearl’s formal
definition of causality, our definition of blameworthiness is
based on the principle of alternative possibilities. However,
because Marc Pauly’s framework separates agents and out-
comes, the proposed definition of blameworthiness is differ-
ent and, arguably, more succinct.
The main technical result of this paper is a sound and
complete bimodal logical system describing the interplay
between group blameworthiness modality and necessity (or
universal truth) modality. Our system is significantly differ-
ent from earlier mentioned axiomatizations (Xu 1998) and
(Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard 2009) because our seman-
tics incorporates the principle of alternative possibilities.
Paper Outline This paper is organized as follows. First,
we introduce the formal syntax and semantics of our logical
system. Next, we state and discuss its axioms. In the section
that follows, we give examples of formal derivations in our
system. In the next two sections we prove the soundness and
the completeness. The last section concludes with a discus-
sion of possible future work.
Syntax and Semantics
In this paper we assume a fixed set A of agents and a fixed
set of propositional variables Prop. By a coalition we mean
an arbitrary subset of set A.
Definition 1 Φ is the minimal set of formulae such that
1. p ∈ Φ for each variable p ∈ Prop,
2. ϕ→ ψ,¬ϕ ∈ Φ for all formulae ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ,
3. Nϕ, BCϕ ∈ Φ for each coalition C ⊆ A and each for-
mula ϕ ∈ Φ.
In other words, language Φ is defined by grammar:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | Nϕ | BCϕ.
FormulaNϕ is read as “statement ϕ is true under each play”
and formula BCϕ as “coalition C is blamable for ϕ”.
Boolean connectives ∨, ∧, and ↔ as well as constants
⊥ and ⊤ are defined in the standard way. By formula Nϕ
we mean ¬N¬ϕ. For the disjunction of multiple formulae,
we assume that parentheses are nested to the left. That is,
formula χ1 ∨ χ2 ∨ χ3 is a shorthand for (χ1 ∨ χ2) ∨ χ3. As
usual, the empty disjunction is defined to be ⊥. For any two
setsX and Y , byXY we denote the set of all functions from
Y to X .
The formal semantics of modalities N and B is defined in
terms of models, which we call games.
Definition 2 A game is a tuple (∆,Ω, P, pi), where
1. ∆ is a nonempty set of “actions”,
2. Ω is a set of “outcomes”,
3. the set of “plays” P is an arbitrary set of pairs (δ, ω) such
that δ ∈ ∆A and ω ∈ Ω,
4. pi is a function that maps Prop into subsets of P .
The example from the introduction can be captured in our
setting by assuming that Lopez is the only actor who has
two possible actions: hide and expose the gun in the game
with two outcomes alive and dead. Although a complete
action profile is a function from the set of all agents to
the domain of actions, in a single agent case any such pro-
file can be described by specifying just the action of the
single player. Thus, by complete action profile hide we
mean action profile that maps agent Lopez into action hide.
The set of possible plays of this game consists of pairs
{(hide, alive), (expose, alive), (expose, dead)}.
The above definition of a game is very close but not iden-
tical to the definition of a game frame in Pauly (2001; 2002)
and the definition of a concurrent game structure, the seman-
tics of ATL (Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman 2002). Unlike
these works, here we assume that the domain of choices
is the same for all states and all agents. This difference
is insignificant because all domains of choices in a game
frame/concurrent game structure could be replaced with
their union. More importantly, we assume that the mecha-
nism is a relation, not a function. Our approach is more gen-
eral, as it allows us to talk about blameworthiness in nonde-
terministic games, it also results in fewer axioms. Also, we
do not assume that for any complete action profile δ there is
at least one outcome ω such that (δ, ω) ∈ P . Thus, we allow
the system to terminate under some action profiles without
reaching an outcome. Without this assumption, we would
need to add one extra axiom: ¬BC⊥ and to make minor
changes in the proof of the completeness.
Finally, in this paper we assume that atomic propositions
are interpreted as statements about plays, not just outcomes.
For example, the meaning of an atomic proposition p could
be statement “either Lopez locked his gun or his grand-
daughter is dead”. This is a more general approach than the
one used in the existing literature, where atomic propositions
are usually interpreted as statements about just outcomes.
This difference is formally captured in the above definition
through the assumption that value of pi is a set of plays, not
just a set of outcomes. As a result of this more general ap-
proach, all other statements in our logical system are also
statements about plays, not outcomes. This is why relation
 in Definition 3 has a play (not an outcome) on the left.
If s1 and s2 are action profiles of coalitions C1 and C2,
respectively, and C is any coalition such that C ⊆ C1 ∩ C2,
then we write s1 =C s2 to denote that s1(a) = s2(a) for
each agent a ∈ C.
Next is the key definition of this paper. Its item 5 formally
specifies blameworthiness using the principle of alternative
possibilities.
Definition 3 For any play (δ, ω) ∈ P of a game
(∆,Ω, P, pi) and any formula ϕ ∈ Φ, the satisfiability re-
lation (δ, ω)  ϕ is defined recursively as follows:
1. (δ, ω)  p if (δ, ω) ∈ pi(p), where p ∈ Prop,
2. (δ, ω)  ¬ϕ if (δ, ω) 1 ϕ,
3. (δ, ω)  ϕ→ ψ if (δ, ω) 1 ϕ or (δ, ω)  ψ,
4. (δ, ω)  Nϕ if (δ′, ω′)  ϕ for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P ,
5. (δ, ω)  BCϕ if (δ, ω)  ϕ and there is s ∈ ∆
C such that
for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if s =C δ
′, then (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ.
Axioms
In addition to the propositional tautologies in language Φ,
our logical system contains the following axioms.
1. Truth: Nϕ→ ϕ and BCϕ→ ϕ,
2. Distributivity: N(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Nϕ→ Nψ),
3. Negative Introspection: ¬Nϕ→ N¬Nϕ,
4. None to Blame: ¬B∅ϕ,
5. Joint Responsibility: if C ∩D = ∅, then
NBCϕ ∧ NBDψ → (ϕ ∨ ψ → BC∪D(ϕ ∨ ψ)),
6. Blame for Cause: N(ϕ→ ψ)→ (BCψ → (ϕ→ BCϕ)),
7. Monotonicity: BCϕ→ BDϕ, where C ⊆ D,
8. Fairness: BCϕ→ N(ϕ→ BCϕ).
We write ⊢ ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the axioms of
our system using the Modus Ponens and the Necessitation
inference rules:
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
,
ϕ
Nϕ
.
We write X ⊢ ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the theo-
rems of our logical system and an additional set of axioms
X using only the Modus Ponens inference rule.
The Truth axiom for modality N, the Distributivity ax-
iom, and the Negative Introspection axiom together with the
Necessitation inference rule capture the fact that modality
N, per Definition 3, is an S5 modality and thus satisfies all
standard S5 properties.
The Truth axiom for modality B states that any coalition
can be blamed only for a statement which is true. The None
to Blame axiom states that the empty coalition cannot be
blamed for anything. Intuitively, this axiom is true because
the empty coalition has no power to prevent anything.
The Joint Responsibility axiom states that if disjoint coali-
tionsC andD can be blamed for statementsϕ andψ, respec-
tively, on some other (possibly two different) plays of the
game and the disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ is true on the current play,
then the union of the two coalitions can be blamed for this
disjunction on the current play. This axiom remotely resem-
bles Xu (1998) axiom for independence of individual agents,
which in our notations can be stated as
NBa1ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ NBanϕn → N(Ba1ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Banϕn).
Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard (2009) captured the inde-
pendence of disjoint coalitions C andD in their Lemma 17:
NBCϕ ∧ NBDψ → N(BCϕ ∧ BDψ).
In spite of these similarities, the defini-
tion of responsibility used in (Xu 1998) and
(Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard 2009) does not assume
the principle of alternative possibilities. The Joint Respon-
sibility axiom is also similar to Marc Pauly (2001; 2002)
Cooperation axiom for logic of coalitional power:
SCϕ ∧ SDψ → SC∪D(ϕ ∧ ψ),
where coalitions C and D are disjoint and SCϕ stands for
“coalition C has a strategy to achieve ϕ”.
The Blame for Cause axiom states that if formula ϕ uni-
versally implies ψ (informally, ϕ is a “cause” of ψ), then
any coalition blamable for ψ should also be blamable for the
“cause” ϕ as long as ϕ is actually true. The Monotonicity
axiom states that any coalition is blamed for anything that a
subcoalition is blamed for. Finally, the Fairness axiom states
that if a coalitionC is blamed forϕ, then it should be blamed
for ϕ whenever ϕ is true.
Examples of Derivations
The soundness of the axioms of our logical system is es-
tablished in the next section. In this section we give sev-
eral examples of formal proofs in our system. Together with
the Truth axiom, the first example shows that statements
BCBCϕ and BCϕ are equivalent in our system. That is,
coalition C can be blamed for being blamed for ϕ if and
only if it can be blamed for ϕ.
Lemma 1 ⊢ BCϕ→ BCBCϕ.
PROOF. Note that ⊢ BCϕ → ϕ by the Truth axiom. Thus,
⊢ N(BCϕ→ ϕ) by the Necessitation rule. At the same time,
⊢ N(BCϕ→ ϕ)→ (BCϕ→ (BCϕ→ BCBCϕ))
is an instance of the Blame for Cause axiom. Then,
⊢ BCϕ → (BCϕ → BCBCϕ) by the Modus Ponens
inference rule. Therefore, ⊢ BCϕ → BCBCϕ by the
propositional reasoning. ⊠
The rest of the examples in this section are used later in
the proof of the completeness.
Lemma 2 ⊢ NBCϕ→ (ϕ→ BCϕ).
PROOF. Note that ⊢ BCϕ→ N(ϕ → BCϕ) by the Fairness
axiom. Hence, ⊢ ¬N(ϕ → BCϕ) → ¬BCϕ, by the law
of contrapositive. Thus, ⊢ N(¬N(ϕ→ BCϕ)→ ¬BCϕ) by
the Necessitation inference rule. Hence, by the Distributivity
axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
⊢ N¬N(ϕ→ BCϕ)→ N¬BCϕ.
At the same time, by the Negative Introspection axiom:
⊢ ¬N(ϕ→ BCϕ)→ N¬N(ϕ→ BCϕ).
Thus, by the laws of propositional reasoning,
⊢ ¬N(ϕ→ BCϕ)→ N¬BCϕ.
Hence, by the law of contrapositive,
⊢ ¬N¬BCϕ→ N(ϕ→ BCϕ).
Note that N(ϕ → BCϕ) → (ϕ → BCϕ) is an instance of
the Truth axiom. Thus, by propositional reasoning,
⊢ ¬N¬BCϕ→ (ϕ→ BCϕ).
Hence, ⊢ NBCϕ→ (ϕ→ BCϕ) by the definition of N. ⊠
Lemma 3 If ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ, then ⊢ BCϕ→ BCψ.
PROOF. By the Blame for Cause axiom,
⊢ N(ψ → ϕ)→ (BCϕ→ (ψ → BCψ)).
Assumption ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ implies ⊢ ψ → ϕ by the laws of
propositional reasoning. Thus, ⊢ N(ψ → ϕ) by the Neces-
sitation inference rule. Hence, by the Modus Ponens rule,
⊢ BCϕ→ (ψ → BCψ).
Thus, by the laws of propositional reasoning,
⊢ (BCϕ→ ψ)→ (BCϕ→ BCψ). (1)
Note that ⊢ BCϕ → ϕ by the Truth axiom. At the same
time, ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ by the assumption of the lemma. Thus,
by the laws of propositional reasoning, ⊢ BCϕ → ψ.
Therefore, ⊢ BCϕ → BCψ by the Modus Ponens inference
rule from statement (1). ⊠
Lemma 4 ϕ ⊢ Nϕ.
PROOF. By the Truth axioms, ⊢ N¬ϕ → ¬ϕ. Thus, by the
law of contrapositive, ⊢ ϕ→ ¬N¬ϕ. Hence, ⊢ ϕ→ Nϕ by
the definition of the modality N. Therefore, ϕ ⊢ Nϕ by the
Modus Ponens inference rule. ⊠
The next lemma generalizes the Joint Responsibility ax-
iom from two coalitions to multiple coalitions.
Lemma 5 For any integer n ≥ 0 and any pairwise disjoint
sets D1, . . . , Dn,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, χ1 ∨ · · · ∨χn ⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨χn).
PROOF. We prove the lemma by induction on n. If n = 0,
then disjunctionχ1∨· · ·∨χn is Boolean constant false⊥ by
definition. Thus, the statement of the lemma is ⊥ ⊢ B∅⊥,
which is provable in the propositional logic due to the as-
sumption ⊥ on the left-hand side of ⊢.
Next, suppose that n = 1. Then, from Lemma 2 it follows
that NBD1χ1, χ1 ⊢ BD1χ1.
Suppose that n ≥ 2. By the Joint Responsibility axiom
and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
NBD1∪···∪Dn−1(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1),NBDnχn,
χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1 ∨ χn
⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn−1∪Dn(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1 ∨ χn).
Thus, by Lemma 4,
BD1∪···∪Dn−1(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1),NBDnχn,
χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1 ∨ χn
⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn−1∪Dn(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1 ∨ χn).
At the same time, by the induction hypothesis,
{NBDiχi}
n−1
i=1
, χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1
⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn−1(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1).
Hence,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1, χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1 ∨ χn
⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn−1∪Dn(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1 ∨ χn).
Since χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1 ⊢ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1 ∨ χn is provable
in propositional logic,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1
⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn−1∪Dn(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1 ∨ χn). (2)
Similarly, by the Joint Responsibility axiom and the Modus
Ponens inference rule,
NBD1χ1,NBD2∪···∪Dn(χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn),
χ1 ∨ (χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn)
⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn−1∪Dn(χ1 ∨ (χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn)).
Since formula χ1 ∨ (χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn)↔ χ1 ∨ χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn
is provable in the propositional logic, by Lemma 3,
NBD1χ1,NBD2∪···∪Dn(χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn), χ1 ∨ χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn
⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn−1∪Dn(χ1 ∨ χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn).
Thus, by Lemma 4,
NBD1χ1,BD2∪···∪Dn(χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn), χ1 ∨ χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn
⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn−1∪Dn(χ1 ∨ χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn).
At the same time, by the induction hypothesis,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=2, χ2 ∨ · · · ∨χn ⊢ BD2∪···∪Dn(χ2 ∨ · · · ∨χn).
Hence,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn, χ1 ∨ χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn
⊢ BD1∪D2∪···∪Dn(χ1 ∨ χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn).
Since χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn ⊢ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1 ∨ χn is provable in
propositional logic,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn
⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn−1∪Dn(χ1 ∨ χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn). (3)
Finally, note that the following statement is provable in the
propositional logic for n ≥ 2,
⊢ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn → (χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn−1) ∨ (χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn).
Therefore, from statement (2) and statement (3),
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn ⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn)
by the laws of propositional reasoning. ⊠
Lemma 6 If ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢ ψ, then Nϕ1, . . . ,Nϕn ⊢ Nψ.
PROOF. By the deduction lemma applied n times, assump-
tion ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢ ψ implies that
⊢ ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → . . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . ).
Hence, by the Necessitation inference rule,
⊢ N(ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → . . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . )).
Thus, by the Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens,
⊢ Nϕ1 → N(ϕ2 → . . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . ).
Hence, by the Modus Ponens inference rule,
Nϕ1 ⊢ N(ϕ2 → . . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . ).
Therefore, by applying the previous steps (n − 1) more
times, Nϕ1, . . . ,Nϕn ⊢ Nψ. ⊠
Lemma 7 ⊢ Nϕ→ NNϕ.
PROOF. Formula N¬Nϕ→ ¬Nϕ is an instance of the Truth
axiom. Thus, ⊢ Nϕ → ¬N¬Nϕ by contraposition. Hence,
taking into account the following instance of the Negative
Introspection axiom: ¬N¬Nϕ→ N¬N¬Nϕ, we have
⊢ Nϕ→ N¬N¬Nϕ. (4)
At the same time, ¬Nϕ → N¬Nϕ is an instance of the
Negative Introspection axiom. Thus, ⊢ ¬N¬Nϕ → Nϕ by
the law of contrapositive in the propositional logic. Hence,
by the Necessitation inference rule, ⊢ N(¬N¬Nϕ → Nϕ).
Thus, by the Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens
inference rule, ⊢ N¬N¬Nϕ → NNϕ. The latter, together
with statement (4), implies the statement of the lemma by
propositional reasoning. ⊠
Lemma 8 For any integer n ≥ 0 and any disjoint sets
D1, . . . , Dn ⊆ C,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1,N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ N(ϕ→ BCϕ).
PROOF. By Lemma 5,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, χ1 ∨ · · · ∨χn ⊢ BD1∪···∪Dn(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨χn).
Thus, by the Monotonicity axiom,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn ⊢ BC(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn).
Hence, by the Modus Ponens inference rule
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, ϕ, ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨χn ⊢ BC(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨χn).
By the Truth axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, ϕ,N(ϕ→ χ1∨· · ·∨χn) ⊢ BC(χ1∨· · ·∨χn).
Note that N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn)→ (BC(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn)→
(ϕ → BCϕ)) is an instance of the Blame for Cause axiom.
Thus, by the Modus Ponens inference rule applied twice,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, ϕ,N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ ϕ→ BCϕ.
By the Modus Ponens inference rule,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1, ϕ,N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ BCϕ.
By the deduction lemma,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1,N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ ϕ→ BCϕ.
By Lemma 6,
{NNBDiχi}
n
i=1,NN(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ N(ϕ→ BCϕ).
By the definition of modality N, the Negative Introspection
axiom, and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
{NBDiχi}
n
i=1,NN(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ N(ϕ→ BCϕ)
Therefore, by Lemma 7 and the Modus Ponens inference
rule, the statement of the lemma follows. ⊠
Soundness
In the following lemmas, (δ, ω) ∈ P is a play of an arbitrary
game (∆,Ω, P, pi) and ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ are arbitrary formulae.
Lemma 9 (δ, ω) 1 B∅ϕ.
PROOF. Suppose that (δ, ω)  B∅ϕ. Thus, by Definition 3,
we have (δ, ω)  ϕ and there is an action profile s ∈ ∆∅
such that for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if s =∅ δ
′, then
(δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ.
Consider δ′ = δ and ω′ = ω. Note that s =∅ δ
′
is vacuously true. Hence, (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ. In other words,
(δ, ω) 1 ϕ, which leads to a contradiction. ⊠
Lemma 10 For all sets C,D ⊆ A such that C ∩D = ∅, if
(δ, ω)  NBCϕ, (δ, ω)  NBDψ, and (δ, ω)  ϕ ∨ ψ, then
(δ, ω)  BC∪D(ϕ ∨ ψ).
PROOF. Let (δ, ω)  NBCϕ and (δ, ω)  NBDψ. Thus, by
Definition 3 and the definition of modalityN, there are plays
(δ1, ω1) ∈ P and (δ2, ω2) ∈ P such that (δ1, ω1)  BCϕ
and (δ2, ω2)  BDψ.
By Definition 3, statement (δ1, ω1)  BCϕ implies that
there is s1 ∈ ∆
C such that for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if
s1 =C δ
′, then (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ.
Similarly, by Definition 3, statement (δ2, ω2)  BDψ
implies that there is s2 ∈ ∆
D such that for each play
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if s2 =D δ
′, then (δ′, ω′) 1 ψ.
Consider an action profile s of coalition C ∪D such that
s(a) =
{
s1(a), if a ∈ C,
s2(a), if a ∈ D.
Note that the action profile s is well-defined because sets C
andD are disjoint by the assumption of the lemma.
The choice of action profiles s1, s2, and s implies
that for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if s =C∪D δ
′, then
(δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ and (δ′, ω′) 1 ψ. Thus, for each play
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if s =C∪D δ
′, then (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ ∨ ψ.
Therefore, (δ, ω)  BC∪D(ϕ ∨ ψ) by Definition 3 and due
to the assumption (δ, ω)  ϕ ∨ ψ of the lemma. ⊠
Lemma 11 If (δ, ω)  N(ϕ → ψ), (δ, ω)  BCψ, and
(δ, ω)  ϕ, then (δ, ω)  BCϕ.
PROOF. By Definition 3, assumption (δ, ω)  BCψ implies
that there is s ∈ ∆C such that for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if
s =C δ
′, then (δ′, ω′) 1 ψ.
At the same time, (δ′, ω′)  ϕ → ψ for each play
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P by the assumption (δ, ω)  N(ϕ → ψ) of
the lemma and Definition 3.
Thus, (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P such that
s =C δ
′ by Definition 3. Hence, (δ, ω)  BCϕ by Defini-
tion 3 and the assumption (δ, ω)  ϕ of the lemma. ⊠
Lemma 12 For all sets C,D ∈ A such that C ⊆ D, if
(δ, ω)  BCϕ, then (δ, ω)  BDϕ.
PROOF. By Definition 3, assumption (δ, ω)  BCϕ implies
that (δ, ω)  ϕ and there is s ∈ ∆C such that for each play
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if s =C δ
′, then (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ.
By Definition 2, set∆ is not empty. Let d0 ∈ ∆. Consider
an action profile s′ of coalitionD such that
s′(a) =
{
s(a), if a ∈ C,
d0, if a ∈ D \ C.
Then, by the choice of action profile s and because C ⊆ D,
for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if s′ =D δ
′, then (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ.
Therefore, (δ, ω)  BDϕ by Definition 3 and because
(δ, ω)  ϕ, as we have shown earlier. ⊠
Lemma 13 If (δ, ω)  BCϕ, then (δ, ω)  N(ϕ→ BCϕ).
PROOF. Consider any play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P . By Definition 3, it
suffices to show that if (δ′, ω′)  ϕ, then (δ′, ω′)  BCϕ.
Thus, again by Definition 3, it suffices to prove there is
s ∈ ∆C such that for each play (δ′′, ω′′) ∈ P , if s =C δ
′′,
then (δ′′, ω′′) 1 ϕ. The last statement follows from the
assumption (δ, ω)  BCϕ and Definition 3. ⊠
Completeness
We start the proof of the completeness by defining the
canonical game G(ω0) = (∆,Ω, P, pi) for each maximal
consistent set of formulae ω0.
Definition 4 The set of outcomesΩ is the set of all maximal
consistent sets of formulae ω such that for each formula ϕ ∈
Φ if Nϕ ∈ ω0, then ϕ ∈ ω.
Informally, an action of an agent in the canonical game is
designed to “veto” a formula. The domain of choices of the
canonical model consists of all formulae in set Φ. To veto a
formula ψ, an agent must choose action ψ. The mechanism
of the canonical game guarantees that if NBCψ ∈ ω0 and all
agents in the coalitionC veto formulaψ, then¬ψ is satisfied
in the outcome.
Definition 5 The domain of actions∆ is set Φ.
Definition 6 The setP ⊆ ∆A×Ω consists of all pairs (δ, ω)
such that for any formula NBCψ ∈ ω0, if δ(a) = ψ for each
agent a ∈ C, then ¬ψ ∈ ω.
Definition 7 pi(p) = {(δ, ω) ∈ P | p ∈ ω}.
This concludes the definition of the canonical game
G(ω0). The next four lemmas are auxiliary results leading
to the proof of the completeness in Theorem 1.
Lemma 14 For any play (δ, ω) ∈ P , any action profile s ∈
∆C , and any formula ¬(ϕ → BCϕ) ∈ ω, there is a play
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P such that s =C δ
′ and ϕ ∈ ω′.
PROOF. Consider the following set of formulae:
X = {ϕ} ∪ {ψ | Nψ ∈ ω0}
∪ {¬χ | NBDχ ∈ ω0, D ⊆ C, ∀a ∈ D(s(a) = χ)}.
Claim 1 SetX is consistent.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Suppose the opposite. Thus, there are
formulae Nψ1, . . . ,Nψm ∈ ω0, (5)
and formulae NBD1χ1, . . . ,NBDnχn ∈ ω0, (6)
such that D1, . . . , Dn ⊆ C, (7)
s(a) = χi for all a ∈ Di, i ≤ n, (8)
and ψ1, . . . , ψm,¬χ1, . . . ,¬χn ⊢ ¬ϕ. (9)
Without loss of generality, we can assume that formulae
χ1, . . . , χn are distinct. Thus, assumption (8) implies that
sets D1, . . . , Dn are pairwise disjoint.
By propositional reasoning, assumption (9) implies that
ψ1, . . . , ψm ⊢ ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn.
Thus, by Lemma 6,
Nψ1, . . . ,Nψm ⊢ N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn).
Hence, by assumption (5),
ω0 ⊢ N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn).
Thus, by Lemma 8, using assumptions (6) and the fact that
sets D1, . . . , Dn are pairwise disjoint,
ω0 ⊢ N(ϕ→ BCϕ).
Hence N(ϕ → BC) ∈ ω0 because set ω0 is maximal.
Then, ϕ → BC ∈ ω by Definition 4, which contradicts the
assumption ¬(ϕ → BC) ∈ ω of the lemma because set ω is
consistent. Therefore, set X is consistent. ⊠
Let ω′ be any maximal consistent extension of set X .
Thus, ϕ ∈ X ⊆ ω′ by the choice of sets X and ω′. Also,
ω′ ∈ Ω by Definition 4 and the choice of sets X and ω′.
Let the complete action profile δ′ be defined as follows:
δ′(a) =
{
s(a), if a ∈ C,
⊥, otherwise.
(10)
Then, s =C δ
′.
Claim 2 (δ′, ω′) ∈ P .
PROOF OF CLAIM. Consider any formulaNBDχ ∈ ω0 such
that δ′(a) = χ for each a ∈ D. By Definition 6, it suffices
to show that ¬χ ∈ ω′.
Case I: D ⊆ C. Thus, ¬χ ∈ X by the definition of set X .
Therefore, ¬χ ∈ ω′ by the choice of set ω′.
Case II: D * C. Consider any d0 ∈ D \ C. Thus,
δ′(d0) = ⊥ by equation (10). Also, δ
′(d0) = χ by the
choice of formula NBDχ. Thus, χ ≡ ⊥ and formula ¬χ is
a tautology. Hence,¬χ ∈ ω′ by the maximality of set ω′.⊠
This concludes the proof of the lemma. ⊠
Lemma 15 For any outcome ω ∈ Ω, there is a complete
action profile δ ∈ ∆A such that (δ, ω) ∈ P .
PROOF. Define a complete action profile δ such that δ(a) =
⊥ for each agent a ∈ A. To prove (δ, ω) ∈ P , consider any
formula NBDχ ∈ ω0 such that δ(a) = χ for each a ∈ D.
By Definition 6, it suffices to show that ¬χ ∈ ω.
Case I: D = ∅. Thus, ⊢ ¬BDχ by the None to Blame ax-
iom. Hence, ⊢ N¬BDχ by the Necessitation inference rule.
Then, ¬N¬BDχ /∈ ω0 by the consistency of the set ω0.
Therefore, NBDχ /∈ ω0 by the definition of the modality
N, which contradicts the choice of formula NBDχ.
Case II: D 6= ∅. Thus, there is at least one agent d0 ∈ D.
Hence, χ = δ(d0) = ⊥ by the choice of formulaNBDχ and
the definition of the complete action profile δ. Then, ¬χ is a
tautology. Thus, ¬χ ∈ ω by the maximality of set ω. ⊠
Lemma 16 For any play (δ, ω) ∈ P and any formula
¬Nϕ ∈ ω, there is a play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P such that ¬ϕ ∈ ω′.
PROOF. Consider the set X = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | Nψ ∈ ω0}.
First, we show that set X is consistent. Suppose the oppo-
site. Thus, there are formulae Nψ1, . . . ,Nψn ∈ ω0 such
that ψ1, . . . , ψn ⊢ ϕ. Hence, Nψ1, . . . ,Nψn ⊢ Nϕ by
Lemma 6. Thus, ω0 ⊢ Nϕ because Nψ1, . . . ,Nψn ∈ ω0.
Hence, ω0 ⊢ NNϕ by Lemma 7. Therefore, Nϕ ∈ ω by
assumption ω ∈ Ω and Definition 4. Hence, ¬Nϕ /∈ ω by
the consistency of set ω, which contradicts the assumption
of the lemma. Thus, set X is consistent.
Let ω′ be any maximal consistent extension of set X .
Note that ¬ϕ ∈ X ⊆ ω′ by the definition of set X . By
Lemma 15, there is a complete action profile δ′ such that
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P . ⊠
Lemma 17 (δ, ω)  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ ω for each play (δ, ω) ∈ P
and each formula ϕ ∈ Φ.
PROOF. We prove the lemma by structural induction on for-
mula ϕ. If ϕ is a propositional variable, then the required
follows from Definition 3 and Definition 7. The cases when
ϕ is an implication or a negation follow from the maximality
and the consistency of set ω in the standard way.
Suppose that formula ϕ has the form Nψ.
(⇒) : LetNψ /∈ ω. Thus,¬Nψ ∈ ω by the maximality of set
ω. Hence, by Lemma 16, there is a play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P such
that ¬ψ ∈ ω′. Then, ψ /∈ ω′ by the consistency of set ω′.
Thus, (δ′, ω′) 1 ψ by the induction hypothesis. Therefore,
(δ, ω) 1 Nψ by Definition 3.
(⇐) : LetNψ ∈ ω. Thus,¬Nψ /∈ ω by the consistency of set
ω. Hence, N¬Nψ /∈ ω0 by Definition 4. Then, ω0 0 N¬Nψ
by the maximality of set ω0. Thus, ω0 0 ¬Nψ by the Nega-
tive Introspection axiom. Hence, Nψ ∈ ω0 by the maximal-
ity of set ω0. Then, ψ ∈ ω
′ for each ω′ ∈ Ω by Definition 4.
Thus, by the induction hypothesis, (δ′, ω′)  ψ for each
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P . Therefore, (δ, ω)  Nψ by Definition 3.
Suppose that formula ϕ has the form BCψ.
(⇒) : Assume that BCψ /∈ ω. First, we consider the case
when ψ /∈ ω. Then, (δ, ω) 1 ψ by the induction hypothesis.
Hence, (δ, ω) 1 BCψ by Definition 3.
Next, assume that ψ ∈ ω. Note that ψ → BCψ /∈ ω.
Indeed, if ψ → BCψ ∈ ω, then ω ⊢ BCψ by the Modus
Ponens inference rule. Thus, BCψ ∈ ω by the maximality
of set ω, which contradicts the assumption above.
Because ω is a maximal set, statement ψ → BCψ /∈ ω
implies that ¬(ψ → BCψ) ∈ ω. Thus, by Lemma 14, for
any action profile s ∈ ∆C , there is a play (δ′, ω′) such that
ψ ∈ ω′. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, for any action
profile s ∈ ∆C there is a play (δ′, ω′) such that (δ′, ω′)  ψ.
Therefore, (δ, ω) 1 BCψ by Definition 3.
(⇐) : Suppose that BCψ ∈ ω. Thus, ω ⊢ ψ by the Truth
axiom. Hence, ψ ∈ ω by the maximality of the set ω. Thus,
(δ, ω)  ψ by the induction hypothesis.
Next, define an action profile s ∈ ∆C to be such that
s(a) = ψ for each a ∈ C. Consider any play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P
such that s =C δ
′. By Definition 3, it suffices to show that
(δ′, ω′) 1 ψ.
Statement BCψ ∈ ω implies that ¬BCψ /∈ ω because
set ω is consistent. Thus, N¬BCψ /∈ ω0 by Definition 4
and because ω ∈ Ω. Hence, ¬N¬BCψ ∈ ω0 due to
the maximality of the set ω0. Thus, NBCψ ∈ ω0 by the
definition of modality N. Also, δ′(a) = s(a) = ψ for each
a ∈ C. Hence, ¬ψ ∈ ω′ by Definition 6 and the assumption
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P . Then, ψ /∈ ω′ by the consistency of set ω′.
Therefore, (δ′, ω′) 1 ψ by the induction hypothesis. ⊠
We are now ready to state and prove the strong complete-
ness of our logical system.
Theorem 1 If X 0 ϕ, then there is a game, a complete
action profile δ, and an outcome ω of this game such that
(δ, ω)  χ for each χ ∈ X and (δ, ω) 1 ϕ.
PROOF. Suppose that X 0 ϕ. Thus, set X ∪ {¬ϕ} is con-
sistent. Let ω0 be any maximal consistent extension of set
X∪{¬ϕ} andG(ω0) = (∆,Ω, P, pi) be the canonical game
defined above. Note that ω0 ∈ Ω by Definition 4 and the
Truth axiom.
By Lemma 15, there exists a complete action profile
δ ∈ ∆A such that (δ, ω0) ∈ P . Thus, (δ, ω0)  χ for each
χ ∈ X and (δ, ω0)  ¬ϕ by Lemma 17 and the choice of
set ω0. Therefore, (δ, ω0) 1 ϕ by Definition 3. ⊠
Conclusion
In this paper we defined a formal semantics of blameworthi-
ness using the principle of alternative possibilities and Marc
Pauly’s framework for logics of coalitional power. Our main
technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical sys-
tem that captures properties of blameworthiness in this set-
ting. This work is meant to be a step towards formal reason-
ing about blameworthiness and responsibility.
Recently, there have been several works com-
bining Marc Pauly’s and epistemic logic frame-
works to study the interplay between knowledge and
know-how strategies (A˚gotnes and Alechina 2012;
A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016; Naumov and Tao 2017;
Naumov and Tao 2018b; Naumov and Tao 2018c;
Naumov and Tao 2018a) as well as a study of such
strategies in a single-agent case (Fervari et al. 2017).
Knowledge is clearly relevant to the study of blameworthi-
ness. Indeed, one can hardly be blamed for not preventing
an outcome if one had a strategy to prevent it but did not
know what this strategy was. Furthermore, in the legal
domain, responsibility is connected to knowledge. For
example, US Model Penal Code specifies five types of
responsibility based on what the responsible party knew
or should have known (Institute 1985 Print). In the future,
we plan to explore the interplay between knowledge and
blameworthiness/responsibility by introducing epistemic
component to the framework of this paper.
References
[A˚gotnes and Alechina 2012] A˚gotnes, T., and Alechina, N.
2012. Epistemic coalition logic: completeness and complex-
ity. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume 2 (AA-
MAS), 1099–1106.
[A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016] A˚gotnes, T., and Alechina, N.
2016. Coalition logic with individual, distributed and
common knowledge. Journal of Logic and Computation.
exv085.
[A˚gotnes et al. 2010] A˚gotnes, T.; Balbiani, P.; van Dit-
marsch, H.; and Seban, P. 2010. Group announcement logic.
Journal of Applied Logic 8(1):62 – 81.
[A˚gotnes, van der Hoek, and Wooldridge 2009] A˚gotnes, T.;
van der Hoek, W.; and Wooldridge, M. 2009. Reasoning
about coalitional games. Artificial Intelligence 173(1):45 –
79.
[Alechina et al. 2011] Alechina, N.; Logan, B.; Nguyen,
H. N.; and Rakib, A. 2011. Logic for coalitions with
bounded resources. Journal of Logic and Computation
21(6):907–937.
[Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman 2002] Alur, R.; Hen-
zinger, T. A.; and Kupferman, O. 2002. Alternating-time
temporal logic. Journal of the ACM 49(5):672–713.
[Batusov and Soutchanski 2018] Batusov, V., and Soutchan-
ski, M. 2018. Situation calculus semantics for actual causal-
ity. In Proceedings of the 32nd AAAI Conference on Artifi-
cial Intelligence (AAAI-18).
[Belardinelli 2014] Belardinelli, F. 2014. Reasoning about
knowledge and strategies: Epistemic strategy logic. In
Proceedings 2nd International Workshop on Strategic Rea-
soning, Grenoble, France, April 5-6, 2014, volume 146 of
EPTCS, 27–33.
[Borgo 2007] Borgo, S. 2007. Coalitions in action logic.
In 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, 1822–1827.
[Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard 2009] Broersen, J.; Herzig,
A.; and Troquard, N. 2009. What groups do, can do, and
know they can do: an analysis in normal modal logics. Jour-
nal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 19(3):261–289.
[Cushman 2015] Cushman, F. 2015. Deconstructing intent to
reconstruct morality. Current Opinion in Psychology 6:97–
103.
[Fervari et al. 2017] Fervari, R.; Herzig, A.; Li, Y.; and
Wang, Y. 2017. Strategically knowing how. In Proceed-
ings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-17, 1031–1038.
[Fields 1994] Fields, L. 1994. Moral beliefs and blamewor-
thiness: Introduction. Philosophy 69(270):397–415.
[Fischer and Ravizza 2000] Fischer, J. M., and Ravizza, M.
2000. Responsibility and control: A theory of moral respon-
sibility. Cambridge University Press.
[Frankfurt 1969] Frankfurt, H. G. 1969. Alternate possibil-
ities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy
66(23):829–839.
[Galimullin and Alechina 2017] Galimullin, R., and
Alechina, N. 2017. Coalition and group announce-
ment logic. In Proceedings Sixteenth Conference on
Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK)
2017, Liverpool, UK, 24-26 July 2017, 207–220.
[Goranko and Enqvist 2018] Goranko, V., and Enqvist, S.
2018. Socially friendly and group protecting coalition log-
ics. In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 372–380.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Mul-
tiagent Systems.
[Goranko, Jamroga, and Turrini 2013] Goranko, V.; Jam-
roga, W.; and Turrini, P. 2013. Strategic games and truly
playable effectivity functions. Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems 26(2):288–314.
[Goranko 2001] Goranko, V. 2001. Coalition games and al-
ternating temporal logics. In Proceedings of the 8th confer-
ence on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge,
259–272. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc.
[Goudkamp 2004] Goudkamp, J. 2004. The spurious re-
lationship between moral blameworthiness and liability for
negligence. Melb. UL Rev. 28:343.
[Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner 2018] Halpern, J. Y., and
Kleiman-Weiner, M. 2018. Towards formal definitions
of blameworthiness, intention, and moral responsibility. In
Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Arti-
ficial Intelligence (AAAI-18).
[Halpern 2016] Halpern, J. Y. 2016. Actual causality. MIT
Press.
[Institute 1985 Print] Institute, A. L. 1985 Print. Model Pe-
nal Code: Official Draft and Explanatory Notes. Complete
Text of Model Penal Code as Adopted at the 1962 Annual
Meeting of the American Law Institute at Washington, D.C.,
May 24, 1962. The Institute.
[Juarez and Miracle 2018] Juarez, L., and Miracle, V.
2018. Toddler dies in Muscoy shooting after 4-year-
old cousin gets hold of gun; grandfather arrested. KABC.
http://abc7.com/4-year-old-shoots-kills-toddler-cousin-in-ie;-
grandpa-arrested/3794943/.
[Mason 2015] Mason, E. 2015. Moral ignorance and blame-
worthiness. Philosophical Studies 172(11):3037–3057.
[Naumov and Tao 2017] Naumov, P., and Tao, J. 2017.
Coalition power in epistemic transition systems. In Proceed-
ings of the 2017 International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 723–731.
[Naumov and Tao 2018a] Naumov, P., and Tao, J. 2018a.
Second-order know-how strategies. In Proceedings of the
2018 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 390–398.
[Naumov and Tao 2018b] Naumov, P., and Tao, J. 2018b.
Strategic coalitions with perfect recall. In Proceedings of
Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
[Naumov and Tao 2018c] Naumov, P., and Tao, J. 2018c.
Together we know how to achieve: An epistemic logic of
know-how. Artificial Intelligence 262:279 – 300.
[Nichols and Knobe 2007] Nichols, S., and Knobe, J. 2007.
Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science
of folk intuitions. Nous 41(4):663–685.
[Oreskes 2018] Oreskes, B. 2018. 4-year-old
accidentally shoots and kills toddler cousin in
San Bernardino County. Los Angeles Times.
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-muscoy-toddler-shooting-20180720-story.html.
[Pauly 2001] Pauly, M. 2001. Logic for Social Software.
Ph.D. Dissertation, Institute for Logic, Language, and Com-
putation.
[Pauly 2002] Pauly, M. 2002. A modal logic for coali-
tional power in games. Journal of Logic and Computation
12(1):149–166.
[Sauro et al. 2006] Sauro, L.; Gerbrandy, J.; van der Hoek,
W.; and Wooldridge, M. 2006. Reasoning about action and
cooperation. In Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS ’06, 185–192. New York, NY, USA: ACM.
[Singer and Eddon 2013] Singer, P., and Eddon, M. 2013.
Moral responsibility, problem of. Encyclopædia Britan-
nica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/problem-of-moral-
responsibility.
[van der Hoek and Wooldridge 2005] van der Hoek, W., and
Wooldridge, M. 2005. On the logic of cooperation and
propositional control. Artificial Intelligence 164(1):81 –
119.
[Widerker 2017] Widerker, D. 2017. Moral responsibility
and alternative possibilities: Essays on the importance of
alternative possibilities. Routledge.
[Xu 1998] Xu, M. 1998. Axioms for deliberative stit. Jour-
nal of Philosophical Logic 27(5):505–552.
